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Abstract: The careers of many public officials span multiple localities, yet the economic effects of their inter-regional 
movements are not well understood. This paper focuses on the rotation of provincial leaders in China and studies its impact 
on regional economic integration. Estimation results using the gravity framework indicate that when a provincial leader is 
appointed as the party secretary of a new province, the trade volume from the new province to the old province increases, 
but not vice versa. Additional analyses using two novel datasets that capture the intensity of inter-provincial socioeconomic 
activities in China corroborate this finding. We then construct a quantitative trade model that incorporates input-output 
linkages and show that removing such inter-provincial links associated with the rotation of provincial leaders leads to an 
average welfare loss of 0.03%. 
Keywords: Regional integration, Domestic trade, Leadership rotation in China 
1. Introduction 
Inter-regional rotation of personnel is common in the 
public sector. In the United States, bureaucrats and 
professional city managers advance their careers by 
oving from small to large localities (Carpenter, 2001; 
Watson and Hassett, 2004). In countries like Kenya, 
Russia, and China, national leaders regularly initiate 
reshuffles of local politicians and bureaucrats for 
political and strategic purposes (Hassan, 2016; 
Huang, 2002; Willerton, 1992). The rotation of 
officials sometimes even takes place on a global scale 
within a large, supra-national unit. Under the British 
Empire, for instance, colonial governors developed 
careers that spanned colonies in different continents 
(Xu, 2018). Through these rotations, officials can 
develop networks with firms and businesses in 
multiple localities. However, our understanding of 
how these rotations shape inter-regional economic 
activities still remains limited.  
In this paper, we study the economic impact of the 
inter-regional rotation of government officials in the 
context of China. Specifically, we leverage China’s 
unique cadre management system to empirically 
identify the effect of leading officials’ cross-regional 
linkages on interprovincial trade, as measured by the 
volume of railway cargo. Relying on a newly 
collected data set that records the careers of the 
universe of political leaders at the municipal-level 
and above in China since 1999, we use the gravity 
framework to estimate the effect of provincial 
leadership rotation on inter-provincial trade in China. 
Our estimations in the benchmark setup show that 
when the party secretary (head of the local 
Communist Party Committee) of province A used to 
work as party secretary or governor of province B, the 
trade flow from province A to province B increases, 
but not vice versa. By contrast, the rotation of 
provincial governors, who are in charge of local 
economic development but ranked lower than 
provincial party secretaries, does not have any 
consistent effect on inter-provincial trade. These 
results are robust to including the multilateral 
resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), 
running regressions with first-differencing to address 
potential endogeneity in policy changes (Baier and 
Bergstrand,2007; Baier et al., 2014), and using 
various subsets of observations. We also find that this 
effect on inter-provincial trade is more salient when 
the party secretary 
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of the new province used to hold a more senior position in the previous
province.
We further explore whether the effect of the provincial leader-
ship rotation on railway cargo flows is due to trade creation or trade
diversion by utilizing two novel datasets. The first dataset is compiled
from the “major events” chapter of each province’s statistical year-
book. This section of the yearbook records, in chronological fashion,
important political, economic, and social events that take place in a
province. We conduct a text analysis and find that when the party sec-
retary of province A used to work as party secretary or governor of
province B, province A’s major event records contain more socioeco-
nomic events related to province B. In addition, the increased number
of events recorded are associated with business and inter-governmental
exchange, but not with transportation, sports, or culture. Moreover,
we also study the establishment of regional chambers of commerce
(RCoCs, hereafter), a type of non-government organizations that aims to
enhance business activities across regions. Using the Cox proportional
hazard model, we show that when the party secretary of province A
used to work in province B, merchants from province B are more likely
to set up an RCoC in province A. These results are consistent with the
gravity estimations and provide plausible explanations for how the rota-
tions of provincial party secretaries affect railway cargo flows through
reducing trade frictions.
Lastly, to quantify the welfare effects of leadership rotations, we
construct and analyze a multi-region, multi-sector, Ricardian trade
model. In this model, regions represent Chinese provinces or Rest of
World and are connected through tradable agricultural and manufac-
turing goods. The model also incorporates input-output linkages like
in Caliendo and Parro (2015) to capture both the direct and indirect
effects of trade cost changes. We calibrate the model using data to
match the effect of provincial leadership rotation on domestic trade
with the results from the gravity estimations. In the benchmark sce-
nario in which there is no trade diversion, connecting two provinces
by leadership rotation reduces the uni-directional trade cost by 3.9%.
In addition, removing the connections established through leadership
rotations results in an average welfare loss of 0.03% among Chinese
provinces. Moreover, we do not find evidence of welfare maximizing
incentive of the actual provincial leadership rotations from the simula-
tion results of the calibrated model.
Our research connects two separate but related fields in the liter-
ature. On the one hand, since the seminal work of Jones and Olken
(2005), a number of studies have found that political leaders matter
for economic growth (Besley et al., 2011; Adolph, 2013; Hodler and
Raschky, 2014; Yao and Zhang, 2015).1 However, we are not aware
of any research that has explored the effect of leaders on trade across
regions. On the other hand, trade economists have paid great atten-
tion to the political determinants of trade frictions (Meon and Sekkat,
2008; Dutt and Traca, 2010; Head et al., 2010; Berger et al., 2013), but
the role of political leaders has yet to be studied. We rely on the grav-
ity framework, which is consistent with a large class of trade models,
to analyze the effect of the rotation of provincial leaders in China on
1 A growing body of research has specifically investigated the effects of polit-
ical leaders on the economy within the context of China. An early pioneering
study by Li and Zhou (2005), for example, finds that “the likelihood of promo-
tion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the
likelihood of termination decreases with their economic performance”. Xu et al.
(2007) emphasize the role of provincial governors and find that a new provin-
cial governor relocated from another province can improve GDP growth by 1%.
On the other hand, Yang et al. (2010) find that a new provincial party secretary
or governor from the central government actually hinders GDP growth. The
latest work in this strand of literature is by Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016)
in which they distinguish provincial party secretaries promoted within the
provinces they govern from those relocated from outside. The authors find that
local provincial party secretaries spend a greater share of budgetary resources
on education and health care and invest less in construction infrastructure.
inter-regional trade. In doing so, we help to address the respective gaps
in the two areas of research.
Furthermore, our work also complements existing studies on domes-
tic fragmentation and trade frictions in China. Starting from Young
(2000)’s controversial claim that China’s reform since the 1980s “has
resulted in a fragmented internal market with fiefdoms controlled by
local officials”, other researchers have also found evidence of local pro-
tectionism using various data sources and empirical methods (Bai et al.,
2004; Poncet, 2005; Lu and Tao, 2009). However, while most studies
consider political factors to be one of the potential mechanisms, not
many of them provide direct empirical analysis. One exception is Xu
and Cao (2017), who find that the relocation of provincial leaders also
accompanies capital flow in the same direction. The other is the concur-
rent work by Nian and Wang (2019), who find that firms follow their
headquarter city politician’s move by purchasing more land at lower
prices. Most closely related to our paper here is the recent work by Shi
et al. (2019), who provide evidence that cross-regional movements of
prefecture-level leaders induce investments to move from leaders’ old
posting localities to the new ones. We differ from these works in two
ways. First, we focus on the movements of provincial leaders instead
of city-level leaders; provincial politicians are fewer in numbers but
potentially have more power and means to influence the economy given
their elevated status in the political system. Second, and more impor-
tantly, instead of mainly focusing on investment growth in destination
cities, we examine a much wider range of socioeconomic activities in
the destination and origin localities. Our analysis based on several new
data sources suggests that cross-regional movements of political leaders
can also lower trade frictions and lead to a more general deepening of
inter-regional economic linkages, as evidenced by the more rapid flows
of goods, entrepreneurs, and information.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the
administrative structure and cadre rotation system in China. Various
datasets used in the empirical analysis are also introduced in this
section. Section 3 describes the setup of gravity equations and analyzes
the regression results. Section 4 focuses on exploring whether the grav-
ity estimates are a result of trade creation or trade diversion and pro-
vides additional evidence using data from the major event records and
the establishment of the RCoCs. In section 5, we construct and calibrate
a quantitative trade model to quantify the welfare effects of leadership
rotation. The last section concludes with a summary.
2. Background and data
In this section, we first briefly discuss the political structure and
the cadre rotation system in China. Descriptive evidence is presented to
support our claim that the rotation of provincial leaders can be consid-
ered a quasi-natural experiment. The data used in the empirical analysis
are also introduced in this section.
2.1. Provincial leadership rotations in China
China has a one-party political system with the highest decision-
making body being the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the
Communist Party. Each Chinese province (including direct-controlled
municipalities and autonomous regions, all of which hold provincial
status) has two political leaders: party secretary and governor. The
party secretary is the head of the provincial Communist Party Com-
mittee, whereas the governor is the head of the provincial govern-
ment. Party secretaries are ranked higher than provincial governors,
even though governors in theory have the executive power (Yao and
Zhang, 2015). Provinces are the highest sub-national units in China’s
administrative hierarchy, hence provincial leaders have the final say
over the most important political, policy, and personnel matters within
their provinces. They can, for example, grant informal subsidies or tax
rebates to certain firms or sectors, provide government guarantees for
bank financing, and protect investors’ property rights against predation
2
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by lower level officials. Therefore, the preferences and performance
of provincial party secretaries often have significant implications for
the patterns of economic activities both within and between provinces
(Persson and Zhuravskaya, 2016).
Both party secretaries and government executives are appointed by
the Organization Department of the Party Committee one level above.2
At provincial level, the promotion of senior leaders is determined by the
PSC. Provincial leaders are regularly rotated across different regions.
This has been a long-standing practice that can be traced back to
as early as the Qin Dynasty (221–206 BCE) (Zhao, 2015). This prac-
tice distinguishes China not only from democracies, wherein politi-
cians rarely change the constituencies they represent, but also from
many Communist/non-liberal democratic regimes, in which the fre-
quency of inter-regional transfers is much lower (Rochlitz et al., 2015).
Among officials who served as provincial party secretaries or governors
between 1999 and 2016, almost all of them worked in more than one
province and about 42% of them served in leadership posts (i.e., party
secretary or governor) in two or more provinces.
We claim that the choice of destination for any given rotation at
province level is determined in quasi-random fashion. In other words,
while it may be possible to predict which provincial leader will be pro-
moted or rotated to another province, no observable measures can pre-
dict the destination of the rotation. We provide descriptive evidence
to support our claim in this section and present additional empiri-
cal evidence in the Appendix. First, it is important to note that the
goals that rotation seeks to achieve are mostly political rather than
economic. According to the Chinese Communist Party’s own organi-
zation document, cadre rotation is intended to serve three main func-
tions: (1) to fulfill certain policy tasks in the destination province, (2)
to hone the leadership skills of the selected cadres, and (3) to prevent
cadres from holding a leadership position for too long in a given locality
(CCP, 1999, 2006). Economic considerations are typically secondary in
reshuffling decisions. Moreover, in practice, the destination of the rota-
tion at province level is heavily influenced by the availability of appro-
priate positions. Most of the time, such availability in turn depends
on a series of complicated factors beyond an individual’s control, such
as retirement, term limits, disciplinary investigations, or simply move-
ments in other positions.
The quasi-random nature of the rotation process can be best illus-
trated through an examination of the career trajectory of the cur-
rent general secretary Xi Jinping. As the son of a vice-premier and
someone who joined the ranks of “reserve cadres” very early in his
career, Xi’s career has presumably involved a much greater degree
of deliberate planning and high-level intervention compared to most
other politicians. However, while Xi regularly experienced promotions
and transfers throughout his career, the destinations of those trans-
fers appear to have been anything but planned. More specifically, Xi
underwent two major reshuffles as a provincial leader. First, in 2002,
he moved from provincial governor of Fujian to provincial governor
(and later provincial secretary) of the neighboring Zhejiang province.
Before Xi, no provincial leader in Fujian had ever been appointed later-
ally to Zhejiang3; Xi himself also described his transfer as “completely
unexpected”, as he had initially expected to be placed in a western
province, where he had deeper personal and family connections (Weng,
2005).
In 2007, Xi, who was then the party secretary of Zhejiang, experi-
enced another rotation—or plausibly a major but implicit promotion.
He was appointed to be the party secretary of Shanghai, a position
2 For government executives, appointments have to be approved by the local
People’s Congress, but this procedure is just a formality in most cases.
3 In a more systematic analysis, we compile a comprehensive list of province
pairs that have experienced movement of leading provincial cadres (i.e., the
provincial secretary or the governor). We find a total of 60 pairs between 1995
and 2014, but only two pairs (Jilin to Chongqing and Qinghai to Jiangxi) saw
the movement of more than one provincial leader.
widely regarded as a critical stepping stone to membership in the PSC.
Although at that time Xi was seen by many as a likely contender for a
central leadership post, no one was able to predict that his path to the
party center would run through Shanghai. This path was not available
until September 2006, when the position was vacated due to the unex-
pected firing of the former Shanghai party boss, Chen Liangyu (Jiang
and Yang, 2016). Even after the purge, the central leadership did not
see Xi as the most preferable candidate to fill that vacancy, and his
appointment was the result of a compromise between major political
coalitions at the top (WikiLeaks, 2006).
In Table A.2 of the Appendix, we provide more systematic evidence
on the exogenous nature of rotation destinations by regressing the inci-
dents of leadership rotation on a host of covariates for both the origin
and destination provinces. Our analysis suggests that although the eco-
nomic performance of a party secretary’s current province does have
some predictive power for whether a rotation will occur, none of the
commonly used provincial socioeconomic variables (e.g., GDP, popu-
lation, distance to/contiguity with the origin province) can accurately
predict whether a province will be the destination of a rotated leader.
This gives us some confidence in the credibility of our research design.
We offer a number of additional tests to address the potential endo-
geneity problem in later sections.
2.2. Data
The data on political leaders are drawn from the China Political Elite
Database (CPED),4 a newly constructed database containing extensive
biographical information on over 4000 key municipal, provincial, and
national leaders in China since the late 1990s. For each leader, the
CPED provides standardized information about the time, place, orga-
nization, and rank of every job assignment listed in his or her curricu-
lum vitae, which is collected from government websites, yearbooks, and
other trustworthy online sources. In this paper, we focus on the subset
of officials who served at top provincial posts (i.e., as provincial secre-
taries or governors) between 1999 and 2016.
Fig. 1 visualizes the inter-provincial linkages established by
governor-to-secretary or secretary-to-secretary rotations. During the
period covered by our data, there were a total of 55 links created by
such rotations, of which 37 were due to secretary-to-secretary rota-
tions and 18 were due to governor-to-secretary rotations. All but one
of the mainland provinces (Ningxia) either received provincial party
secretaries from or sent top leaders to become party secretaries in
other provinces. Generally speaking, more developed and politically
significant provinces are more likely to be the destination of rotations.
However, consistent with our earlier claim about exogeneity, the pat-
terns of movement also show that party secretaries who arrive at these
more prestigious destinations can come from a wide range of origin
provinces, and it is quite rare for there to be more than one leadership
movement between any given province dyad.5
Whereas the focus of this paper is on the relationship between cadre
rotation and economic linkages across provinces in China, the fact that
there is no official record of inter-provincial trade flows poses a major
challenge. As documented in Yu (2013), existing studies focusing on
domestic trade in China have either used the inter-provincial input-
output table, which covers a very short time span, or had to estimate
trade flows using gravity estimations. Our approach is to approximate
the domestic trade across Chinese provinces using the volume of rail-
way cargo, which is published annually in the China Railway Yearbook.
4 See Jiang (2018) for the details of the database.
5 In the empirical analysis, we use several ways to address the presence of
implicit hierarchies among provinces, including using time-varying fixed effects
for both origin and destination provinces and conducting sub-sample analyses
that exclude “better” destinations such as the centrally directed municipalities
(zhixia shi).
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Fig. 1. Provinces Connected by Leadership Rotation. Note: This figure presents cross-province movements of top provincial politicians in China between 1999 and
2016. The arrows indicate the directions of movements. The data include both governor-to-secretary and secretary-to-secretary rotations.
This is the only publicly available dataset that records inter-provincial
economic activities annually over an extended period of time. The rail-
way is the second most commonly used cargo transportation method in
China (next to road transportation). It accounts for about 13% of the
total cargo freight and is highly correlated with the cargo volume from
other means of transportation. We use the railway data to construct a
panel of province dyads for 17 years. We include all possible combina-
tions of province pairs in the panel, except for those with Tibet, which
had very limited railway connection with the rest of China for much of
the period covered by our data.
In addition to data on railway cargo, we also construct an origi-
nal measure for the overall level of socioeconomic exchange between
provinces. Our data source is the “major events” chapter of each
province’s annual yearbook. These chapters detail, in a chronological
fashion, important political, economic, and social events that take place
in a province, usually based on a synthesis of the entire year’s provin-
cial newspaper articles. Digital copies of these chapters were obtained
from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) for the period
between 2000 and 2016.
Finally, we also construct a third measure on the movement of
business actors across provinces based on the establishment of RCoCs.
RCoCs are voluntary associations formed by private entrepreneurs with
common hometown origins; they serve as a relatively institutional-
ized platform for members to share information, seek legal and finan-
cial assistance, and organize other collective undertakings important
for their business operations (Yu and Zhou, 2012).6 Governments of
host provinces also use RCoCs as a tool to attract investments and
hence stimulate local economic growth. We collected information for
all RCoCs through an extensive Internet search and recorded each one’s
year of establishment.7 A total of 517 RCoCs were found during the
period of our sample.
6 For instance, private merchants from Zhejiang, a province known for its
commercial activism, were pioneers in creating RCoCs during the 1990s when
Zhejiang merchants expanded their businesses to the rest of the country.
7 Each province can only establish one RCoC in another provinces. We also
do not observe any closure of RCoCs once they are established.
4
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3. The effects of provincial leadership rotation on trade
In this section, we first introduce the gravity framework, which has
become the conventional approach for studying the determinants of
trade flows (Berger et al., 2013). We then present and discuss our main
findings followed by an event study and robustness checks.
3.1. Empirical framework
We rely on the gravity equation to estimate how provincial lead-
ership rotation affects domestic trade across provinces in China. This
framework has been widely used to study the impact of various types of
bilateral trade frictions.8 Our starting point, defined in Head and Mayer
(2014) as the “naive gravity equation”, takes the following form:
log VAB,t = c + 𝛽A log YA,t + 𝛽B log YB,t
+ 𝛽XXAB,t + fAB + yeart + 𝜀AB,t , (1)
where VAB is the trade flow from province A to province B, Y is the
province’s output measured by its GDP, XAB,t is a vector of measures
of bilateral trade frictions between A and B, and fAB is the province-
pair fixed effect, and yeart is the year fixed effect. The province-pair
fixed effect fAB controls all time-invariant factors that affect domestic
trade between provinces, such as distance, common language, cultural
similarity, and their difference in economic development and politi-
cal significance. In addition, including fAB also addresses the concern
that some share of cargo may be shipped to coastal provinces and then
exported.
This “naive gravity equation” has been viewed as empirically suc-
cessful in analyzing international trade flows, but the theoretical jus-
tifications of this setup have been questioned by recent works such as
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Head and Mayer (2014). In
particular, this regression equation restricts the effects of third-party
regions on logVAB,t (the multilateral resistance term discussed in Ander-
son and van Wincoop, 2003) to be time-invariant. Therefore, we also
consider the “structural gravity equation” in Head and Mayer (2014) to
relax this restriction. This equation can be expressed as:
log VAB,t = c + 𝛽XXAB,t + fAB + fA,t + fB,t + 𝜀AB,t . (2)
Including origin–year fixed effect fA,t and destination–year fixed effect
fB,t fully captures the time-variant multilateral resistance terms.9 In
addition, this formulation is consistent with a large set of conventional
trade models, as discussed in Head and Mayer (2014).
In this paper, the inter-provincial linkages established by cross-
provincial leadership rotations will be modeled as factors of trade fric-
tions and captured in X. More precisely, we construct a binary vari-
able secretaryAB,t to indicate whether the provincial party secretary of
province A at time t formerly worked in province B as secretary or gov-
ernor. governorAB,t is defined analogously for governors. We also include
lags and leads to address the possible delay and anticipation effect of
the arrival of the new leader.
We interpret positive and significant coefficients of these linkage
indicators as evidence that leadership rotations have an effect on
inter-provincial trade. This interpretation rests on the assumption that
provincial leadership rotations are orthogonal to the unobserved factors
of the origin and destination provinces that can affect the bilateral trade
flows. In other words, no variables that affect provincial trade flows can
predict the destination of provincial leadership rotations. In addition to
the anecdotal evidence discussed in Section 2.1, we also check whether
measures of economic activities have any predictive power on the des-
tination of the leadership rotation in Section 0.2 of the Appendix. The
8 See Head and Mayer (2014) for a comprehensive review of gravity equa-
tions.
9 We use the algorithm described in Correia (2016) for estimations with high
dimensional fixed effects.
empirical results from various specifications all support this identifica-
tion assumption.
As discussed in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Baier et al. (2014),
using gravity equations to estimate the effect of policy changes on bilat-
eral trade flows may create an endogeneity bias. In the context of this
paper, it is possible that the dummies indicating rotation-induced link-
ages may be correlated with unobserved time-variant trade cost mea-
sures. To address this potential issue, we also present an alternative
approach following the estimation strategy introduced in Baier et al.
(2014). In particular, we consider the first-differencing specification:
Δn log VAB,t = c + 𝛽X (ΔnXAB,t) + fAB + fA,t + fB,t + 𝜀AB,t , (3)
where Δn refers to first-differencing over n years. This equation is
obtained by first-differencing equation (2) and adding a pair fixed effect
fAB. Note that fA,t and fB,t here capture origin-specific and destination-
specific changes over time. In addition, the pair fixed effect fAB captures
unobserved changes in bilateral trade frictions that evolve smoothly
over time.
3.2. Benchmark results
The regression results for our benchmark analysis are displayed in
Table 1. Column 1 reports estimates of equation (1). This “naive grav-
ity equation” includes year and province-pair fixed effects, but does not
capture the multilateral resistance terms. We focus on inter-provincial
linkages created by the rotations of the provincial party secretary and
governor, both contemporaneously and with a one-year lag. In total,
there are eight linkage dummies in the regression represented in Col-
umn 1. We can see that the coefficient for the lagged party secretary’s
linkage secretaryAB,t−1 is positive and significant at the 10% level. The
estimate is somewhat noisy, most likely because of the inclusion of its
contemporaneous counterpart secretaryAB,t , which does not have a sig-
nificant effect in itself but tends to increase collinearity. By contrast,
none of the other three types of leader linkages (lagged or contempora-
neous) pass the conventional threshold of statistical significance. This
result suggests that the cargo flow from province A to province B will
be significantly greater if province A’s party secretary used to work as
the party secretary or governor of province B, and the effect comes with
a one-year lag. Interestingly, we do not find any consistently positive
effect from linkages established by movements of governors. One reason
could be that there are relatively few governor-to-governor rotations in
our sample. However, this is also consistent with the general impression
that the party secretary is the one with greater de facto power in the
provincial leadership duo.10
In Column 2, we follow equation (2) and use origin–year and
destination–year fixed effects to control for time-variant multilateral
resistance terms as suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
In Column 3, we add one-year leads to investigate whether railway
cargo flows “anticipate” leadership rotations. Lastly, in Column 4, we
use PPML instead of OLS to address issues related to heteroskedasticity.
Note that the dependent variable in Column 4 is VAB,t but not logVAB,t .
In all regressions, secretaryAB,t−1 is the only variable that has a pos-
itive and significant coefficient at 10%. Other contemporaneous and
lagged leadership rotation dummies all have insignificant coefficients
in the first two columns. When leads are added in Column 3 and Col-
umn 4, a few other leadership rotation dummies become significant in
one regression but do not exhibit any stable pattern. In Section.C.1 in
the Appendix, we explore different combinations of lags and leads, and
the significance of secretaryAB,t−1 remains robust at the 10% level or
higher. Given these results, we will use the specification with one-year
lag in the remainder of the empirical exercise.
Table 2 presents regression results following the first-differencing
10 For other studies that have found strong economic impacts by party secre-
taries, see Jiang and Zhang (2020); Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016).
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Table 1
Gravity estimation using railway cargo data.
Dependent variable: logVAB,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)






















































































Pair FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(A, t) and (B, t) FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Method OLS OLS OLS PPML
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.98
Observations 14,790 14,790 13,920 13,471
Note: This table presents the gravity estimation of the effect of provincial leaders’
trans-regional linkages on inter-provincial railway cargo. The dependent variable
is logged railway cargo from province A to B. secretaryAB,t is a binary indicator
that takes the value of 1 if the incumbent provincial party secretary in province
A at time t had prior leadership experience in province B. The notations for other
independent variables can be interpreted in the same way. Standard errors clustered
at province-pair level are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
setup in equation (3). We follow Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Baier
et al. (2014) and choose n = 5.11 Column 2 reports estimates of equa-
tion (3), whereas column 1 does not include the pair fixed effects. In
both columns, Δ5secretaryAB,t−1 has a positive and significant coeffi-
cient. Similar to the results presented in Table 1, none of the other
three variables have significant coefficients.
To provide a more substantive interpretation of the result, we bench-
mark the effect of party secretaries with the effect of geographic dis-
tance in the gravity framework. We regress logVAB,t on log(distance)
after controlling for the multilateral resistance terms, and the coeffi-
cient of log(distance) is −1.64. In our dataset, the average geographic
distance between two Chinese provinces is about 1420 km. Based on
Tables 1 and 2, the estimated effects of the connection through party
secretary rotation on the same outcome range from 0.125 to 0.176,
which correspond to a 108- to 152-km reduction in distance.
11 Our estimates are not sensitive to difference values of n. Figure A.1 in the
Appendix illustrates the coefficient of ΔnsecretaryAB,t−1 from using different val-
ues of n. With the exception of n = 1, the coefficient is always positive and
statistically significant at 10% or higher.
Table 2
Gravity estimation in changes.



















(A, t) and (B, t) FE ✓ ✓
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.62
Observations 10,440 10,440
Note: This table presents results of the gravity equa-
tion in five-year changes. Standard errors clustered
at province-pair level are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
6
J. Jiang, Y. Mei Journal of Development Economics 147 (2020) 102524
Fig. 2. Results from Event Studies. Note: The top panel of this figure depicts the estimates in the event study regression of linkage formation through provincial
leader rotation, whereas the bottom panel depicts the estimates when such linkage breaks. 90% confidence intervals plotted with robust standard errors.
3.3. Results from an event-study approach
A central assumption for the validity of our research design is that
the movements of provincial secretaries are orthogonal to the socioeco-
nomic exchange between the origin and destination provinces. To eval-
uate this assumption empirically, we adopt an event-study approach
to closely examine the change of inter-provincial trade volumes a few
years before and after key leadership turnovers. Specifically, we focus
on two types of events. One is two provinces A and B becoming con-
nected when a new provincial secretary with past work experience in
B is appointed in A (Event G), and the second is two provinces getting
de-linked when a party secretary with work experience in both A and B
is replaced by one without such experience (Event L).








𝛿L𝜏𝟙{t − LAB = 𝜏} + fAB + fA,t + fB,t + 𝜀AB,t . (5)
GAB and LAB denote the years in which event G and L happened
(between provinces A and B), respectively, and 𝟙 is an indicator func-
tion that takes the value of 1 if a province pair is in the 𝜏th year relative
to the event (G or L), and 0 otherwise. The results from the regressions
are visualized in Fig. 2. The top panel shows the estimates around the
time of forming a dyadic linkage. We can see that two provinces that
will soon be connected through the rotation of a party secretary do not
7
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Table 3
Robustness checks for gravity estimation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)





























































Adjusted R2 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95
Observations 11,050 11,050 11,832 10,353 14,788 13,311 14,790
Note: This table presents the robustness checks of the gravity estimation. The first three columns exclude province-pairs with directly-
controlled municipalities, autonomous provinces, and prestigious provinces, respectively. Column 4 and 6 exclude main coal- and iron-
producing provinces. Column 7 uses a less stringent measure of the connection associated with the rotation of provincial party secretaries.
The dependent variable for Column 5 is the log of volume of railway cargo excluding coal transported from province A to province B at
year t. For all other columns, the dependent variable is logVAB,t . All regressions include origin-year, destination-year, and province-pair
fixed effects. Standard error clustered at province-pair level in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
exhibit significantly different levels of trade volume than other province
pairs until the linkage actually materializes. Furthermore, the bottom of
Fig. 2 suggests that the trade volume reverts back to normal in about
two years after the two provinces are de-linked due to the departure of a
connecting party chief.12 These patterns suggest that the effects we are
capturing are highly specific to the presence or absence of individual
leaders who function as a bridge between provinces.
3.4. Robustness checks
We conduct a series of additional regressions to check the robust-
ness of our benchmark analysis. The regression results are presented
in Table 3. In the first column, we exclude province pairs that involve
Direct-Controlled Municipalities (DCMs hereafter). The four DCMs in
China (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing) are province-level
cities, so their geographical size and population are much smaller.
Column 2 excludes autonomous regions, which are provinces with a
significant share of minority ethnic groups. Excluding the DCMs and
autonomous regions addresses the concern that province-level politi-
cians appointed to these provinces may have specific patterns or specific
policy goals (boosting economic activities among the ethnic groups,
for example). Column 3 excludes destination provinces in which the
provincial party secretaries are also members of the current Politburo.
These party secretaries enjoy a higher political rank within the political
system compared to other provincial party secretaries and governors.
We can see that in all three columns, secretaryAB,t−1 remains statisti-
cally significant. None of the other three leader-rotation dummies, on
the other hand, has a significant coefficient.
In China, the shipment of coal and iron ore makes up a substantial
share of the railway cargo. We use regressions illustrated by Columns
4 to 6 to rule out the possibility that our main results are driven solely
by changes in cargo flows of these two commodities. In Column 4, we
exclude the top ten coal-producing provinces as the origin of cargo flow.
In Column 5, we use the log of total volume of railway cargo minus coal
as the dependent variable. In Column 6, we exclude observations with
12 This result partially addresses the worry that unobserved policies from the
central government may lead to both a relocation of the party secretary and the
increase in trade flow. If this is the case, the positive effect on trade flow should
not disappear after the end of the connection.
the top three provinces ranked by iron ore extraction as the origin.13
Again, secretaryAB,t−1 remains statistically significant at 10% in all three
regressions, and the other three linkage dummies do not have a signifi-
cant coefficient.
In Column 7, to partly deal with the issue that only a small pro-
portion of the observations record party secretaries rotating from the
destination province to the origin province, we introduce an alternative
measure of inter-provincial linkage with an expanded definition. This
variable secretaryAB,t−1(alt) takes the value of 1 as long as the party
secretary of province A used to work in province B as a member of
the provincial party standing committee.14 From Column 7, we can see
that the coefficient of secretaryAB,t−1(alt) is still positive and significant
at 5%, but with a smaller magnitude. This result is expected: members
of the provincial standing committee are not as senior as party secre-
taries and governors and hence are less likely to build extensive local
networks that can later be used to influence inter-provincial trade flows.
However, since secretaryAB,t−1(alt) records more leadership rotations
across provinces, the resulting standard error is smaller than regres-
sions with secretaryAB,t−1 in Table 1.
4. Trade creation or trade diversion?
In this section, we further explore the potential mechanisms behind
our main results. Specifically, we are interested in understanding
whether the observed increase in trade between linked provinces is
due to trade creation or trade diversion. Trade creation refers to the
scenario in which leadership rotations help to reduce trade frictions
faced by firms in linked provinces. Alternatively, it is also possible
that the party secretary arbitrarily increases the cost of exporting to
all provinces except for those where he/she used to work, creating a
scenario of trade diversion. We start by analyzing whether relocating
provincial leaders will also affect railway cargo between other province
pairs. We then provide additional evidence on the trade-boosting effects
13 We only exclude the top three because iron ore production in China is highly
concentrated, with Liaoning, Hebei, and Sichuan accounting for almost half of
the national production.
14 The party standing committee in each province usually consists of 12 mem-
bers, with the most senior two being the party secretary and the governor
(always the first-ranked deputy party secretary). Summary statistics of the two
measures of inter-provincial linkage are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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of provincial leader rotation by analyzing two other complementary
data sources. Results from both analyses support our findings in Section
3 and are consistent with the trade creation effect of provincial leader
rotations.
4.1. Railway cargo flows to other provinces
The regression results presented in Section 3 are about the rela-
tive differences between provinces connected through leader rotation
and unconnected provinces. Therefore, from those results we could not
distinguish whether the effect of provincial party secretary rotation is
due to trade creation or trade diversion. On one hand, if the provincial
party secretary in province A used to work in province B, this con-
nection could reduce the trade frictions faced by firms in province A
when exporting to province B. On the other hand, it is also possible
that the provincial party secretary arbitrarily increases the trade cost
of exporting to other provinces, hence diverting trade from province A
to province B. Both theories are consistent with the results presented in
Section 3, yet their welfare effects are different: trade creation improves
welfare by reducing frictions, whereas trade diversion generates distor-
tions that reduces welfare.
To distinguish between the two mechanisms, we include in our
regressions another dummy secretaryAO,t−1, which takes the value of
1 if province A has secretary-based linkage with any province O other
than B in year t, and 0 otherwise.15 Focusing on the effect of provincial
party secretary rotation, the naive gravity equation now becomes:
log VAB,t = c + 𝛽1secretaryAB,t−1 + 𝛽2secretaryAO,t−1
+ 𝛽A log YA,t + 𝛽B log YB,t + fAB + yeart + 𝜀AB,t ,
whereas the structural gravity equation becomes
log VAB,t = c + 𝛽1secretaryAB,t−1 + 𝛽2secretaryAO,t−1
+ fAB + fA + fB,t + 𝜀AB,t .
In other words, 𝛽1 captures the effect of the connection between
province A and province B through the rotation of the party secretary
in A as in the previous section, whereas 𝛽2 captures the average effect
of the connection between province A and other (non-B) provinces on
railway cargo flows from A to B. Note that the fixed effects in the naive
gravity equation is the same as in (1). However, because of the way
we construct secretaryAO,t−1, we can only include the origin fixed effect
fA instead of the origin–year fixed effect fAt in the structural gravity
equation.
The regression results are presented in Table 4. Column 1 follows
the setup of naive gravity equation, Column 2 follows the structural
gravity equation, and Column 3 uses PPML instead of OLS. In all three
regressions, secretaryAO,t−1 is insignificant and the magnitude of the
coefficient is much smaller compared to that of secretaryAB,t−1.16 These
results suggest that when A and B are connected through leader rota-
tion, railway cargo flows from A to other provinces do not experience
any significant change. We consider the results as evidence against the
potential mechanism of trade diversion.
4.2. Major event records
Next, we move to analyzing each province’s major event records for
evidence of trade creation associated with provincial leadership rota-
tions. As discussed in Section 2, the major event records document
important political, economic, and social events that take place in a
15 This approach is similar to Berger et al. (2013), which examines whether
the increase in imports from the United States after CIA interventions is due to
trade creation or trade diversion.
16 Note that secretaryAB,t−1 also becomes insignificant in Column 1, but the
p-value is a very close 0.102.
Table 4
Trade creation or trade diversion.
(1) (2) (3)


















Pair FE ✓ ✓ ✓
A and (B, t) FE ✓ ✓
Method OLS OLS PPML
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.93 0.97
Observations 14,790 14,790 14,432
Note: All regression include secretaryBA,t−1, governorAB,t−1, and
governorBA,t−1. secretaryAO,t−1 measures potential trade diversion effect
of the linkage between province A and some other province on the
railway cargo flow from province A to province B. Standard error
clustered at province-pair level in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
province in each year. We construct a variable, MentioningAB,t , to cap-
ture the total number of times the name of province B appears in the
“major events” chapter of province A’s official yearbook in year t. In
addition to this count variable, we also construct several binary indica-
tors to denote whether there is any mention of specific kinds of inter-
provincial events, including business, government exchange, culture
and sports, and joint transportation infrastructure projects. Similar to
the analysis in previous sections, we focus on whether inter-provincial
linkages established by provincial leaders’ rotations have any effect on
these outcomes.
The results for the major event records are presented in Table 5. In
Column 1, we follow the naive gravity equation and include pair and
year fixed effects. Among the four dummies indicating rotation-induced
linkages, only secretaryAB,t has a positive and statistically significant
coefficient at 5%. In other words, the effect of inter-provincial leader-
ship linkages on MentioningAB,t is again directional and only exists for
party secretaries. Note that the effect of the rotation on major events
is immediate. In Column 2, we further include the leadership linkage
dummies with one-year lag, and secretaryAB,t is still the only one with a
significant coefficient. This is different from the effect on railway cargo
flows illustrated in Section 3: When the party secretary of the origin
province used to work in the destination province in year t, the railway
cargo flow will increase in t + 1. This difference in timing seems sen-
sible: After a leadership rotation, it will take more time for the firms
to reorganize their supply and sales networks (reflected in cargo trade)
than to change other kinds of activities (joint conferences and official
visits, for example) recorded in the major event records. In Column 3,
we follow the structural gravity equation and use fA,t and fB,t to control
for multilateral resistance terms. In Columns 4 and 5, we use a negative
binomial regression instead of OLS. In all regressions, the coefficient of
secretaryAB,t is still positive and significant at 5%. By contrast, none of
the other three types of leader-based linkages seem to have a stable and
significant coefficient.
We then identify different types of events based on an extensive
keyword search.17 We categorize the entries of the major event records
into four groups: business, inter-governmental exchange, transporta-
tion, and sports and culture. Table 6 reports the regression results
using the same setup as Column 3 in Table 5. Column 1 of Table 6
17 The details of the keyword list and related examples can be found in Section
D of the Appendix.
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Table 5
Major event records.
Dependent variable: Counts of B in A’s Record

























































































Method OLS OLS OLS NB NB
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Pair FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(A, t) and (B, t) FE ✓
Observations 11,256 10,584 13,328 10,720 10,036
Note: This table reports regression results using each province’s major event record. The dependent
variable is the total number of times the name of province B appears in the “major events” chapter
of province A’s official yearbook in year t. The first three columns are OLS regressions whereas
the last two are negative binomial regressions. Standard error clustered at province-pair level in
parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Table 6
Major event records by categories.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)









































Adjusted R2 0.62 0.41 0.31 0.31 0.37
Observations 13,328 13,328 13,328 13,328 13,328
Note: The dependent variable in Column 1 is total counts. From Column 2 to Column 5, the depen-
dent variable is the total number of times of province B appears in entries that belong to a cer-
tain category in province A’s major event record at year t. All regressions include origin-year,
destination-year, and province-pair fixed effects. Standard error clustered at province-pair level in
parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
uses total counts as the dependent variable and is included for com-
parison purposes. From Column 2 to Column 5, the dependent vari-
able is MentioningCAB,t , the total number of times the name of province
B appears in entries that belong to category C in the “major events”
chapter of province A’s official yearbook in year t. We can see that the
coefficient of secretaryAB,t is positive and significant if the mentions are
related to business or inter-governmental exchange, whereas other link-
age dummies do not have significant coefficients in any regression. As
expected, mentions related to sports and culture do not change signif-
icantly when a provincial party secretary is relocated from province B
to province A. Interestingly, mentions related to transportation, such as
high-speed rail, highway, and civil aviation, also do not change signif-
icantly with the presence or absence of an inter-provincial leadership
linkage. This is probably because large infrastructure projects related to
transportation are often planned and implemented at the national level.
It thus appears that the positive effect of leadership linkage on railway
10
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Table 7
Establishment of Regional Chambers of Commerce.
Event: A establishing RCoC to host merchants from B






























































































Stratified by A ✓ ✓
𝜒2 282.09 400.87 303.42 1960.73
Observations 10,463 10,463 10,463 10,463
Note: This table report estimates of the establishment of regional chambers of
commerce using a Cox hazard model. An event is defined as the origin province
setting up an regional chamber of commerce to host merchants from the des-
tination province at time t. Standard error clustered at province-pair level in
parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
cargo flows is at least partly due to an increase in business and inter-
governmental activities, which could potentially reduce trade frictions
between connected provinces.
4.3. Regional chambers of commerce
In addition to the major event records, we also examine how provin-
cial leadership rotation promotes inter-provincial business activities
through the establishment of RCoCs. RCoCs are voluntary associations
formed by private entrepreneurs with common hometown origins. Typ-
ically, members of an RCoC use this platform to share information, seek
legal and financial assistance, and organize other collective undertak-
ings important for their business operations (Yu and Zhou, 2012). These
functions can often help to lower trade frictions between provinces.
Since a province usually only establishes one RCoC in another
province, survival models are the most appropriate for this kind of time-
to-event analysis. The model we use here is the Cox proportional hazard
model, a semi-parametric model that does not require us to specify the
hazard function. Let 𝜆 denote the hazard function, then 𝜆 takes the
following form:
𝜆(t,X1t ,X2) = 𝜆0(t) exp(X1t · 𝛽1 + X2 · 𝛽2), (6)
where X1t and X2 are time-varying and time-independent covariates,
respectively. Our goal is to use this hazard model to examine whether
inter-provincial leadership linkage affects the probability of setting up
an RCoC. The regressions represented by the first and third columns
are also stratified according to the origin province. Column 2 is not
stratified, so we also control for the origin province’s GDP and total
population.
Table 7 displays the regression results related to the RCoC data. In
all four estimations, an event is defined as province A establishing an
RCoC to host merchants from province B at year t. The first two columns
represent Cox hazard models with time-independent effects only, while
the last two columns include controls with time-dependent effects. Col-
umn 1 and Column 3 are not stratified, whereas Column 2 and Column
4 are stratified by the province in which the RCoC was established. In all
four columns, the dummy indicating that province A’s party secretary
used to work in province B has a positive and significant coefficient.
The other three dummies of leadership linkage do not exhibit any sta-
ble pattern. In other words, if the party secretary in province A used
to work as party secretary in province B, province A is more likely to
set up an RCoC to boost economic activities associated with merchants
from province B. In addition, in all four specifications, province A is
more likely to set up an RCoC to host merchants from province B if A is
closer and B is more developed economically.
Estimation results presented in this section not only corroborate the
results of the gravity regressions in Section 3, but also provide plau-
sible explanations as to why the rotation of provincial party secre-
taries can affect domestic trade flows. The analysis of the major event
records implies that such rotation leads to more socioeconomic activi-
ties between the origin and destination provinces of the rotation, espe-
cially activities related to business and inter-governmental exchange.
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Moreover, the relocation of a party secretary also increases the prob-
ability of establishing an RCoC, a major role of which is precisely to
facilitate inter-provincial business activities. Analysis of both the major
event records and the RCoCs finds a directional pattern that is consis-
tent with the results of the gravity regressions in Section 3.
Existing studies suggest that there may be two possible channels
through which political leaders may be incentivized to influence eco-
nomic activities in the context of China. The first one is rent-seeking:
political leaders offer preferential treatments to connected merchants
for both financial or other forms of return (Bai et al., 2014, 2019; Pei,
2016; Nian and Wang, 2019). The other possibility is that politicians are
driven by career incentives to promote local economic growth (Chen et
al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005; Jia et al., 2015; Persson and Zhuravskaya,
2016). To distinguish between the roles of these two channels would be
an interesting extension. However, we have not been able to find defini-
tive and direct evidence in favor of one channel over the other, partly
because of the relatively small number of province-level rotations. We
leave this question for future researchers to explore.18
5. Quantitative trade model
The preceding analyses show that cross-provincial linkages estab-
lished by provincial party secretaries’ rotations have a discernible
impact on inter-provincial economic activities. A question that remains
is: what are the exact welfare consequences of rotating top provincial
leaders? To answer this question, we first construct a multi-region,
multi-sector Ricardian trade model that captures economic activities
between Chinese provinces and Rest of World. The model also incorpo-
rates input-output linkages like in Caliendo and Parro (2015) to cap-
ture both the direct and indirect effects of trade cost changes. We
then calibrate the model using data from 2012 so that the effect of
provincial leadership rotation on domestic trade flows matches with
the empirical results in Section 3. We find that, if provincial leadership
rotations affect domestic trade only through trade creation, connecting
two provinces through provincial leader rotation is equivalent to an ad
valorem trade cost reduction of 3.9%. In addition, removing the fac-
tual inter-provincial links leads to an average welfare loss of 0.03%.
Whereas we find no evidence of trade diversion in the empirical analy-
sis, this scenario is also considered in the counterfactual exercise in this
section.
5.1. Setup
The economy consists of N provinces in China and one Rest of
World. Each location has J sectors. Locations are denoted by i and n,
whereas sectors are denoted by j and k. The preferences of the house-












A continuum of intermediate goods 𝜔j ∈ [0,1] is produced in each
sector j. The production of each 𝜔j requires two types of inputs: labor
and composite intermediate goods. Let zjn(𝜔j) denote the efficiency of
producing intermediate 𝜔j in country n. The production function of 𝜔j













18 Shi et al. (2019) provide some evidence for the rent-seeking mechanism.
They find that the effect of prefecture-level leadership rotation on cross-regional
investments is stronger in high-rent sectors, and that the survival rate of con-
nected firms is higher than unconnected ones as long as the former’s political
patron is still in the locality.
where ljn is labor and m
k,j
n (𝜔j) is the composite intermediate good from
sector k used for the production of intermediate good 𝜔j. The parameter
𝛾
k,j
n is the share of materials from sector k used in the production of




n = 1 − 𝛾
j
n being the share of value
added. Both value-added shares and intermediate goods shares vary
across countries and sectors.
Production of intermediates is at constant returns to scale and the
market is perfectly competitive. Firms price at unit cost cjn∕z
j
n(𝜔j),














where Pkn is the price of a composite intermediate good from sector k,
and Υjn ≡ ∏Jk=1 (𝛾k,jn )−𝛾k,jn (𝛾 jn)−𝛾 jn is a constant.
Producers of composite intermediate goods in sector j, country n
supply Qjn at minimum cost by purchasing 𝜔j from the lowest cost sup-







where 𝜎j is the elasticity of substitution within sector j and rjn(𝜔j) is
the demand for intermediate goods 𝜔j from the lowest cost supplier.









[∫ pjn(𝜔j)1−𝜎j d𝜔j]1∕(1−𝜎j) is the price of the composite inter-
mediate good and pjn(𝜔j) denotes the lowest price of intermediate good
𝜔j across all locations n. Composite intermediate goods from sector j
are used as materials for the production of intermediate good 𝜔k in the
amount mj,kn (𝜔k) in all sectors k, and as final goods in consumption C
j
n.
Hence, the market clearing condition for the composite intermediate







Trade in goods across locations is costly, and the iceberg trade cost




19 One unit of a tradable intermediate good 𝜔j produced in country





j). The price of 𝜔j















Assume the productivity of 𝜔j in country n is the realization of a
Frechét distribution with location parameter 𝜆jn > 0 and shape param-
eter 𝜃j. Following the interpretation of Eaton and Kortum (2002), a
higher 𝜆jn represents absolute advantage, whereas a smaller 𝜃j implies a
higher dispersion of productivity and hence comparative advantage. We
assume that the distributions of productivities are independent across
goods, sectors, and countries, and 1 + 𝜃j > 𝜎j. Given these assump-














19 Note that in Caliendo and Parro (2015), the iceberg trade cost of sector j
good imported by country n from country i is denoted by 𝜅 jni. We use 𝜅
j
in instead
so that the notations of origin and destination are consistent with the empirical
analysis in this paper.
12
J. Jiang, Y. Mei Journal of Development Economics 147 (2020) 102524


























denote country n’s share of expenditure on sector j goods from country





















In equilibrium, Xjn is the sum of expenditure on composite intermediate













where household income In satisfies In = wnLn + Dn. Dn represents



























































in , an equilibrium is a wage vector
wn and price P
j
n, which satisfies equilibrium conditions (7), (8), (9),
(10), and (12). Using the “exact hat algebra” technique popularized


































































where I′n = ŵnwnLn + Dn. This equilibrium in changes is defined by ŵn
and P̂jn that satisfy equations (13)-(17). Compared to the original set
of equilibrium conditions, now we only need data on bilateral trade
shares 𝜋jin, the share of value added in production 𝛾
j
n, value added wnLn,
the share of intermediate consumption 𝛾k,jn , and sectoral productivity
dispersion 𝜃j.
Fig. 3. Coefficient of the Leadership Rotation Given 𝛿c and 𝛿d. Note: This figure
plots the coefficient of the provincial linkage variable using various values of
(𝛿c, 𝛿d). The red line highlighted in the figure represents the targeted value
from the empirical analysis. (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
5.2. Data and calibration
We rely on the Chinese multi-regional input-output (MRIO) table
for 2012 to obtain trade data between Chinese provinces. The MRIO
table provides inter-regional and inter-sectoral economic flows among
30 economic sectors in China’s 30 regions (excluding Tibet). Details on
how this dataset is constructed can be found in Mi et al. (2018).20 We
further merge the sectors into three main sectors: agriculture, manufac-
turing, and services. The service sector is assumed to be non-tradable,
whereas the other two are tradable. Relying on the procedure discussed
in Caliendo and Parro (2015), we can back out the required trade shares
𝜋
j
in, the share of value added 𝛾
j
n, value added wnLn, and the share of
intermediate consumption 𝛾k,jn . We choose the productivity dispersion
𝜃j for agriculture and manufacturing to be 9.11 and 4, respectively, fol-
lowing the estimation in Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Simonovska
and Waugh (2014). Trade flows of Rest of World are obtained from the
World Input Output Database, whereas the input-output linkage follows
the calibration in Fan (Forthcoming).
To perform counterfactual exercises using the quantitative trade
model constructed, we also need to calibrate how trade costs are
affected by the provincial leadership rotation. Although we find no
evidence of trade diversion in the empirical analysis, we allow this
possibility in the quantitative exercise. In particular, let din = {0,1}
denote whether the provincial party secretary of province i used to work
in province n. We further assume that 𝜅jin(din = 0) = 𝛿
c𝜅
j
in(din = 1) and
𝜅
j
im(din = 0) = 𝛿
d𝜅
j
im(din = 1) ∀m ≠ n. Superscripts c and d of parame-
ter 𝛿 represent trade creation and diversion, respectively. For example,
the provincial party secretary in Chongqing used to work in Liaoning.
This connection may reduce the trade cost from Chongqing to Liaon-
ing (trade creation) or increase the trade cost from Chongqing to other
provinces in China (trade diversion). In other words, the connection
between province i and province n through leadership rotation does not
20 We acknowledge that the MRIO table from Mi et al. (2018) is constructed
from the provincial input-output tables using the gravity model. Unfortunately,
we are not aware of any other source that provides inter-provincial trade data in
China. The measurement errors introduced are alleviated to some extent when
we merge 30 sectors into three main sectors.
13
J. Jiang, Y. Mei Journal of Development Economics 147 (2020) 102524
Fig. 4. Percentage Welfare Changes with Trade Creation Only. Note: This figure presents the percentage welfare changes of Chinese provinces in the counterfactual
equilibrium in which the 17 connected province pairs are broken. In this scenario, the linkage between provinces through provincial leader rotation only has a trade
creation effect.
only affect 𝜅jin but also affects trade costs between province i and other
provinces. Trade creation of the provincial leadership rotation requires
𝛿c > 1, whereas trade diversion requires 𝛿d < 1.
To calibrate 𝛿c and 𝛿d, we first identify the 17 province pairs with
din = 1 in 2011. For each possible value of (𝛿c, 𝛿d), we can solve for the
counterfactual equilibrium in which the connected province pairs in the
factual equilibrium are no longer connected. This is done by computing
𝜅
j
in for the 17 province pairs given (𝛿
c, 𝛿d), and then solving the system
of equation (13)—(17). Next, we run the following regression equation
using the change of log trade flow for both the treated province pairs
and other provinces pairs relative to the factual equilibrium:
Δ log Vin = c + 𝛽Δdin + fn + fi + 𝜀, (18)
where Vin = X1in + X
2
in is the total trade flow from province i to province
n since the service sector is non-traded. This regression equation can be
thought of as the cross-sectional version of equation (3). For each coun-
terfactual equilibrium corresponding to a specific pair of (𝛿c, 𝛿d), we can
conduct the counterfactual exercise with connections being removed
and run this regression to generate a coefficient 𝛽.
We experiment with different values of (𝛿c, 𝛿d), and the resulting
coefficients are presented in Fig. 3. We can see that, as expected, the
estimated coefficient is increasing in 𝛿c and decreasing in 𝛿d. In addi-
tion, the contour lines representing the same value of coefficients are
almost linear. We match 𝛽 estimated in equation (18) with the coeffi-
cient in column 2 of Table 2, which indicates that the change in rail-
way cargo volumes for the connected province pairs are 16.7% more
compared to those with din = 0. The corresponding contour line high-
lighted in Fig. 3 shows that 𝛿c = 1.039 if there is no trade diversion,
whereas 𝛿d = 0.963 if there is no trade creation.
5.3. Counterfactual exercise: Trade Creation Only
With the calibrated model, we first explore the effect of leadership
rotation in the benchmark case in which there is only a trade creation
effect. In other words, we compute the trade flows and welfare changes
in the counterfactual scenario in which the 17 connected province pairs
in the factual equilibrium are no longer connected and hence experi-
ence a uni-directional increase in trade cost by 3.9%. Trade frictions
between other provinces as well as to and from Rest of World remain
unchanged. The percentage welfare changes in each province are illus-
trated in Fig. 4. In the counterfactual equilibrium, almost all provinces
incur a welfare loss as a result of higher trade frictions between the
previously connected provinces. The two provinces that experience the
largest welfare loss are Jilin (0.19%) and Chongqing (0.15%), both of
which are connected to other provinces through leadership rotations
in the factual equilibrium. Meanwhile, the exports and imports of the
Chinese provinces decrease by less than 0.1%, and the welfare of Rest
of World actually does not change significantly. Overall, the average
welfare loss for all Chinese provinces in this counterfactual scenario is
0.03%.
Next, we explore whether the 17 connected province pairs in the
factual equilibrium reflect the welfare-maximizing objective of the Chi-
nese central government. To do so, we first compute the counterfactual
equilibrium in which the 17 connected province pairs are removed.
Next treating this counterfactual equilibrium as a new “factual” equi-
librium, we randomly draw 17 province pairs 1000 times and compute
the corresponding welfare changes relative to the new “factual” equi-
librium.21 For each random draw, we can calculate the average welfare
change of the 30 Chinese provinces (weighted by expenditure), and the
resulting histogram is presented in Fig. 5. We can see that the welfare
improvement brought about by the 17 factual province pairs is close to
the left end of the distribution. It appears that the leadership rotations
that connect these province pairs in 2011 are not driven by the welfare
21 Note that because of the discrete nature of this policy, we cannot apply
the method of mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC)
used in Ossa (2014), Mei (2019), and Mei (2020) to compute optimal leadership
rotations.
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Fig. 5. Randomly Generated Connected
Province Pairs with Trade Creation. Note:
This figure plots the average welfare
improvement of Chinese provinces by ran-
domly drawing 17 province pairs 1000
times. The calculated welfare improvement
is relative to the counterfactual equilibrium
in which the 17 province pairs connected
in reality are removed. The red vertical line
represents the average welfare improve-
ment from connecting 17 factual province
pairs. (For interpretation of the references
to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 6. Percentage Welfare Changes with Trade Diversion Only. Note: This figure presents the percentage welfare changes of Chinese provinces in the counterfactual
equilibrium in which the 17 connected province pairs are broken. In this scenario, the linkage between provinces through provincial leader rotation only has a trade
diversion effect.
maximizing objective of the central government in China.22
5.4. Counterfactual exercise: trade creation and trade diversion
After analyzing the benchmark case in which only trade creation
is considered, we move on to analyze the case of trade diversion. In
this scenario, we set 𝛿c = 1 and 𝛿d = 0.963. The percentage welfare
changes in each province in the counterfactual equilibrium in which
the 17 province pairs disconnect are shown in Fig. 6. Note that in this
22 We also conduct the same exercise in the trade diversion scenario in the
Appendix. Again, there is no clear evidence of welfare-maximizing objective
when leadership rotations create trade diversion only. See Section E in the
Appendix for more details.
case, most provinces in China experience an improvement in welfare.
The rationale behind this is straightforward: in this trade diversion sce-
nario, removing the connection between the 17 provinces decreases
the uni-directional trade costs from the origin of these pairs to all
other provinces. Moreover, note that the magnitude of welfare changes
shown in Fig. 6 is larger than those in Fig. 4. This is also expected,
because each connected province pair only reduces the uni-directional
trade cost between that pair in the trade creation case, but increases
the trade cost of the other 28 province pairs in the trade diversion
case.
We also consider scenarios in which provincial leadership rotations
lead to both trade creation and trade diversion. In other words, after
analyzing the welfare changes in the two cases representing the two
ends of the red line in Fig. 3, we want to also study how the results
change along that line. The average and range of welfare changes of
15
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Fig. 7. Percentage Welfare Changes with Both Trade Creation and Trade Diversion. Note: This figure plots the average and range of welfare changes in Chinese
provinces as a result of removing provincial linkages for different values of 𝛿c and 𝛿d. 𝛿c = 1 means there is only trade diversion and 𝛿c = 1.039 means there is
only trade creation.
Chinese provinces in the counterfactual equilibrium are presented in
Fig. 7. The two ends of the plot represent the case with only trade
diversion depicted in Fig. 6 and the case with only trade creation
depicted in Fig. 4, respectively. We can see that, as 𝛿c increases, the
welfare improvement in Chinese provinces gradually shrinks in mag-
nitude. Also note that both the range and average of welfare change
in the trade diversion only scenario (𝛿c = 1, 𝛿d = 0.963) are much
larger than those in the trade creation scenario (𝛿c = 1.039, 𝛿d = 1).
This is because of the way we define trade creation and diversion in
the model: when the connection between province i and n is broken,
only 𝜅jin increases in the case of trade creation. However, 𝜅
j
im decreases
∀m ≠ n in the case of trade diversion.
6. Conclusion
Political institutions are widely viewed as an important determi-
nant of a country’s economic performance, yet our understanding of
the underlying mechanisms is still relatively limited. Most of the exist-
ing research in the political economy literature focuses on two roles
of institutions: to constrain the discretionary power of the political
sovereignty (North and Weingast, 1989; Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011,
2012; Weingast, 1995) and to establish trust and reputation among
peer economic actors (Milgrom et al., 1990). This paper examines the
economic impact of a less well studied aspect of political institutions:
the cross-regional rotation of public officials. In particular, we explore
the effects of political leaders on domestic trade by using the cadre
rotation system in China. Regression results show that when a provin-
cial party secretary is relocated to a new province, the volume of rail-
way cargo flows from the new province to the old province increases,
but not vice versa. Complementary analyses using major event record
data and the establishment of RCoCs corroborate this result. We also
construct a multi-sector, multi-region, general equilibrium trade model
to quantify the welfare effects of the inter-provincial links associated
with the cadre rotation. Whereas we do not find any evidence of
trade diversion, we consider both scenarios in the quantitative exer-
cise.
This paper suggests a new channel through which political leaders
can influence economic activities: by reducing trade frictions between
provinces and promoting regional integration. Our findings can be
thought of as new evidence linking domestic trade barriers to govern-
ment activities. Moreover, one can also link this paper to studies on firm
structure. It would be interesting to examine whether similar rotation
of personnel within firms can reduce frictions across establishments or
departments.
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Appendix
A. Summary Statistics of Leader Rotation
Column 1 of Table A.1 reports the total number of provincial party secretaries and governors in out dataset. Column 2 and 3 report the mean and
standard deviation of their respective term lengths. The following two columns record the number of times a provincial party secretory or governor
worked as party secretory or governor in other provinces. In the last three columns, we present the number of times a provincial party secretary or
governor worker as a member of provincial standing committee in other provinces, which corresponds to the measure secretaryAB,t−1(alt) used on
Column 7 of Table 3.
Table A.1
Summary Statistics
Total Term Length Rotation (Leader) Rotation (Committee)
Mean SD Once Twice Once Twice Thrice
Party Secretary 115 3.9 2.1 37 7 59 18 1
Governor 146 3.6 1.9 3 0 56 1 0
B. Identification Strategy and Leadership Rotations
The identification assumption of the gravity regressions is that the rotation of provincial party secretaries is orthogonal to economic fundamentals
that affect bilateral trade flows. We conduct various tests to check the validity of this assumption, and the results are presented in Table A.2. For all
six regressions, the dependent variable is an event dummy that indicates whether the party secretary of the origin province moves to the destination
province the following year. The standard errors are clustered at party secretary level. We also control for the level and growth of GDP, total
population, railway cargo volume, distance, and contiguity whenever possible.
The first three columns of Table A.2 are logit regressions that make use of the full sample. Both Column 1 and Column 2 include year fixed
effect, but Column 2 excludes DCM observations. Column 3 introduces a party secretary fixed effect by grouping together observations for each
party secretary.23 Note that while in some regressions the GDP or GDP growth rate of the origin province is significant, none of the variables
related to the destination of the rotation are significant. The volume of railway cargo flow, distance and contiguity are also insignificant in all three
regressions. In other words, even though the economic performance of the party secretary’s current province may have some predictive power on
when he or she will rotate, no variable can predict which province will be the destination of the rotation.
Table A.2
Evidence on Exogeneity of Leadership Rotation
Dependent variable: Party secretary moving from A to B at t+1



























































































Sample full full full rotating rotating rotating
Method logit logit FE logit logit FE logit LPM
FE year year party sec year party sec year & party
sec
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.05
Observations 7830 5850 4234 551 551 551
Note: The dependent variable is an event dummy that indicates whether the party secretary of the origin province
moves to the destination province at year t + 1. The first three columns use the full sample, whereas the last three
only include dyadic observations in which the party secretary of the origin province rotates to another province at
year t + 1. Standard error clustered at province-pair level in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
23 In Column 3 and Column 5, year fixed effect are highly collinear with the party secretary fixed effect and are dropped automatically.
17
J. Jiang, Y. Mei Journal of Development Economics 147 (2020) 102524
Columns 4 to 6 of Table A.2 use a different setup to examine whether measures of economic activities have predictive power conditional on
rotation. Only dyadic observations with a rotation of the party secretary from the origin province in the next year are included. For this reason,
variables related to origin provinces are dropped. The logit regression in Column 4 includes year fixed effects, whereas that in Column 5 groups
together observations of each party secretary. Column 6 represents a linear probability model that features both year and party secretary fixed
effects. The regression results show that, conditional on a rotation taking place, none of the variables are correlated with the destination of the
rotation.
C. Robustness
C.1. Different Lags and Leads
Table A.3 displays the gravity estimations with various lags and leads. All regressions include origin-year, destination-year, and province-year
fixed effects. Regressions shown in Column 1 to Column 3 include the contemporaneous dummy secretaryAB,t and its lags for up to three years,
whereas the other three columns also include leads. We can see that for all six columns, secretaryAB,t−1 is significant at 10% and the value of the
coefficient is relatively stable. On the other hand, the contemporaneous dummy secretaryAB,t and other lags and leads are insignificant in all six
regressions.
Table A.3
Gravity Estimation with Different Lags and Leads
Dependent variable: logVAB,t

















































Adjusted R2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96
Observations 14,790 13,920 13,050 13,920 12,180 10,440
Note: All regressions include origin-year, destination-year, and province-pair fixed effects. Standard error clustered
at province-pair level in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
C.2. Coefficients of ΔnsecretaryAB,t−1
Figure A.1 plots the coefficient of ΔnsecretaryAB,t−1 for different values of n. The regression is the same as the one in Column 1 of Table 2. We
can see that for all but one values of n, the coefficient is significant at 95%. When n = 1, the coefficient is significant at 90%.
Fig. A.1 Coefficients of ΔnsecretaryAB,t−1.
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D. Additional Details about Big Events Data
D.1. Keywords
• Business: 投资 investment,总投资 total investment,集团 business group,企业 firm,公司 company,项目签约, sign a deal博览会 expo,交易
会 trade conference,招商引资 attracting business,企业代表 firm representative,企业家代表 entrepreneur delegate,总经理 general manager,董
事长 chair of the board,总裁 CEO,商业 business
• Inter-governmental exchange:政府代表团 government delegation,党政代表团 party and government delegation,政协考察团 CPPCC delega-
tion,学习考察 study and inspect,我省考察 to study and inspect in our province,考察期间 during inspection,战略合作 strategic partnership
• Sports:锦标赛 tournament,冠军 championship, 亚军 runner-up,季军 third place,金牌 gold medal,银牌 silver medal,铜牌 bronze medal,运动
员 athlete
• Culture:文物 cultural relics,文化 culture,艺术 art,演出 show, 表演 performance,剧院 theater,演员 actor,电视 TV, 电影 movie
• Transportation:列车 train,高铁 high-speed rail, 民航 civil aviation,公路 road,特快 express rail,直飞 direct flight,铁路 railway
D.2. Examples
Business On June 17 and 18, provincial party secretary Meng Jianzhu and governor Huang Zhiquan met with a group of distinguished
entrepreneurs from Zhejiang who came to Jiangxi for business negotiations. 17–18日,省委书记孟建柱,省长黄智权在南昌会见了到籁洽淡合作
的浙江省知名企业家代表团一行 (Jiangxi Yearbook, 2002).
Inter-governmental exchange On May 9th, the Liaoning Party–Government Delegation, which came to Sichuan to inspect the partner assistance
work, met with senior staff in the Sichuan government and signed an strategic agreement. Provincial party secretary of Sichuan, Liu Qibao, and
provincial party secretary of Liaoning, Wang Min, attended the conference and delivered keynote speeches. 5月9日, 来川考察对口援建工作、推动
川辽合作的辽宁省党政代表团, 在成都与四川省举行经济社会发展情况交流会并签署战略合作协议。四川省委书记、省人大常委会主任刘奇葆, 辽宁省
委书记、省人大常委会主任王眠出席情况交流会并作重要讲话 (Sichuan Yearbook, 2010).
Sports The 2006 College Student Rock-Climbing Tournament was held in Guizhou. Athletes from Jiangxi has won both the championship and
the second place. 2006 年中国梵净山东太杯首届全国大学生攀岩精英挑战赛在贵州举行江西省选手包揽冠亚军 (Jiangxi Yearbook, 2006).
Culture The Enterprise Information Publication Center of the National Bureau of Statistics held a publication conference on “the report on the
largest 500 Chinese business groups of 2001”. The Hunan Publication Group was ranked 263 out of the 500 firms, and the first of all firms in the
area of culture and arts.国家统计局中国行业企业信息发布中心在北京举行 “2001 年中国最大500 家企业集团信息发布会”。湖南出版集团列500 强
第263 位,为全国文化艺术类排名第一 (Hunan Yearbook, 2001).
Transportation The Beijing-Shanghai High Speed Rail has officially started operation. The total length of the railway is 1318 km, connecting
seven provinces and municipalities, including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and 24 train stations. The shortest run
is 4 h and 48 min京沪高速铁路正式通车运营。 京沪高速铁路自北京南站至上海虹桥站， 全长 1318 公里，途经北京、天津、河北、山东、安徽、
江苏、上海 7个省、市， 沿途 24个站， 最短行车时间为 4小时 48 分钟 (Shanghai Yearbook, 2011).
E. Randomly Generated Connected Province Pairs with Trade Diversion
The average welfare changes of the 30 Chinese provinces (weighted by expenditure) of the randomly generated province pairs when leadership
rotations only result in trade diversion are presented in Fig A.2. The procedure is exactly the same as the one described in Section 5.3. Note that
in the trade diversion case, randomly generating provincial pairs connected through leadership rotation will lead to a welfare loss relative to the
“factual equilibrium” with no connected provinces. Compared to Fig. 5, the distribution of welfare changes shown in Fig A.2 is less concentrated.
Moreover, the average welfare loss associated with the 17 factual province pairs smaller in magnitude is than the mean welfare loss of the 1000
random draws but still within the 75% percentile.
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Fig. A.2 Randomly Generated Connected Province Pairs with Trade Diversion.
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